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A Plan That Has Been Approved
The same investigation, restaged one beat at a time. Drive it with the arrow keys, space, or autoplay. Nothing is cut from the piece — long runs are split across frames. Read the full investigation or open the Israeli Influence on the United States hub.
“A Plan That Has Been Approved.”
The words of the man many expect to be Israel's next PM, describing the Dahiya Doctrine — a strategy of deliberately disproportionate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Said not as a confession but as policy, in 2008.
Gadi Eisenkot — former IDF chief of staff, war-cabinet observer, now front-runner to unseat Netanyahu on Oct 27 2026 — is the named author of the Dahiya Doctrine: respond to attacks from populated areas with large-scale, deliberately disproportionate destruction of civilian infrastructure to deter. It's not a leaked secret or an enemy's allegation — it was articulated by an Israeli general and formalized in Israel's own think tank, which is exactly why it grades straight.
FACT: the doctrine, the authorship, the verbatim quote, the law (Geneva/Rome prohibit collective punishment + disproportionate force), the UN Goldstone finding on Cast Lead (+ Goldstone's 2011 partial walkback, which his co-authors rejected). SOME SMOKE (posed): Gaza 2023- as genocide/war crimes — before the ICJ/ICC, unadjudicated. DUAL-STANCE FENCE: quoting Israel's own generals is scrutiny of state policy, NOT antisemitism; self-defense is a real right, but the doctrine is about METHOD, which the law governs. Complication carried: Eisenkot later broke with the govt + lost his son in Gaza.
The man: Gadi Eisenkot, former IDF chief, is the front-runner to be Israel's next prime minister.
Why it matters now. Eisenkot was the 21st IDF chief of general staff (2015–2019), a war-cabinet observer (2023–2024), and since 2025 leads the Yashar party. Into the Oct 27, 2026 election he's the leading challenger to Netanyahu — multiple Israeli polls show his party ahead of Likud and him preferred for PM — so, as many put it, the most likely to form the next government. Caveat: Israel elects a parliament, no bloc is projected to reach 61 alone, so the premiership turns on coalition math. Front-runner, not foregone.
The doctrine is real, named, and his — published in Israel's own institutions.
The Dahiya Doctrine is named for the Dahiya quarter of south Beirut (Hezbollah's stronghold), largely razed by Israel in the 2006 Lebanon war. It generalizes that into a strategy: answer attacks from a populated area with large-scale destruction of the surrounding civilian infrastructure to impose deterrent costs. First announced by Eisenkot (then Northern Command chief) in a 2008 Yedioth Ahronoth interview, and set down in writing the same year by Col. Gabi Siboni at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Not an outside allegation — doctrine articulated by Israeli commanders in Israeli outlets.
His own words: 'We will wield disproportionate power… This isn't a suggestion. It's a plan that has already been authorized.'
A direct quotation. In the 2008 Yedioth Ahronoth interview, of Lebanese villages from which Hezbollah might fire, Eisenkot said: 'What happened in the Dahieh quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which shots will be fired in the direction of Israel. We will wield disproportionate power and cause immense damage and destruction. From our perspective, these are military bases… This isn't a suggestion. It's a plan that has already been authorized.' Siboni's INSS text matched it: force 'disproportionate… meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction.' Note the legal hinge built in — reframing villages/civilian neighborhoods as 'military bases,' the exact move the laws of war exist to prevent.
The law: deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and inflicting collective punishment are prohibited.
Black-letter law, not opinion. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute, deliberately targeting civilians/civilian objects, using force disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage, and collective punishment of a population are prohibited and can be war crimes. A doctrine openly calling for 'disproportionate' force against 'civilian infrastructure' explicitly to pressure a population is in direct tension with each rule — which is why proponents reclassify civilian targets as military, and critics call it collective punishment by design. FACT that the law prohibits these and the doctrine (as described) is in tension with it; whether a specific operation crossed the line is for the courts.
A UN inquiry found the doctrine applied in Gaza 2008–09 — with an honest caveat about that report.
The doctrine didn't stay theoretical. The 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission (Goldstone Report, on the 2008–09 war) referred repeatedly to the Dahiya doctrine — 'the application of disproportionate force and the causing of great damage and destruction to civilian property and infrastructure' — concluded it was put into practice, and 'designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.' Fairness caveat we carry: in a 2011 op-ed lead author Richard Goldstone said some conclusions might have differed had Israel cooperated — but his three co-authors publicly reaffirmed the report. FACT that the UN inquiry found the doctrine applied as described; we carry both Goldstone's second thoughts and his co-authors' rejection of them.
Gaza since 2023: the doctrine's logic is widely cited; the legal questions are before the ICJ/ICC — posed, not asserted.
Here we pose, because this is live, adjudicated law. Analysts, journalists, and legal scholars tracking the scale of destruction in Gaza since Oct 2023 repeatedly invoke the Dahiya doctrine as the framework for it — deliberate, system-wide flattening of infrastructure as deterrence. The scale is documented and extraordinary (FACT). Unsettled: the legal characterization — South Africa's ICJ genocide case, and the ICC's Nov 2024 arrest warrants for Netanyahu and ex-defense minister Gallant over alleged war crimes/crimes against humanity. FACT that these proceedings exist and the destruction is vast; SOME SMOKE (posed) that the campaign is genocide or a direct execution of the doctrine — the courts are deciding, and we don't get ahead of them.
The line we hold.
- FACT: Eisenkot — IDF chief 2015–19, war-cabinet observer 2023–24, Yashar leader — is the front-runner vs Netanyahu (Oct 27 2026); caveat: coalition math, no bloc projected to 61 alone.
- FACT: the Dahiya Doctrine is named (2006 Beirut suburb razed), authored by Eisenkot (2008 Yedioth Ahronoth) + formalized by Siboni at Israel's INSS — published Israeli doctrine, not an outside allegation.
- FACT (his words): 'We will wield disproportionate power and cause immense damage and destruction… These are military bases… This isn't a suggestion. It's a plan that has already been authorized.' The legal hinge = relabeling civilian areas 'military bases.'
- FACT: Geneva/Rome prohibit deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, disproportionate force, and collective punishment; the UN Goldstone Report found the doctrine applied in Cast Lead 'to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population' (carry Goldstone's 2011 partial walkback + his co-authors' rejection of it).
- SOME SMOKE (posed): Gaza 2023- as genocide/direct Dahiya execution — before the ICJ (South Africa) and ICC (Nov 2024 warrants for Netanyahu/Gallant). Scale = FACT; verdict = not ours to pronounce.
- COMPLICATION (FACT): Eisenkot authored it in 2008 as a general, did NOT direct the 2023- campaign (observer who LEFT the govt in 2024 + became a Netanyahu critic); his son Gal was killed in Gaza. Hold both.
- DUAL-STANCE FENCE: quoting Israel's own generals/think tank is scrutiny of STATE POLICY, not antisemitism; self-defense is a real right, but the doctrine is about METHOD (which the law governs regardless of the cause); Dahiya ≠ the separate 'Campaign Between Wars.'
Why it matters.
Most alleged war crimes are denied — framed as errors, exceptions, the friction of combat. The Dahiya Doctrine is unusual and important because it's none of those: announced, written down, and defended in advance as deliberate policy. That candor is almost a gift to accountability — no need to infer intent from a crater when a general has told a newspaper the crater is the plan. It also raises the stakes of this election beyond Israel's borders: when a potential PM of a close US ally is the named author of a doctrine a UN inquiry called collective punishment, the question isn't whether criticizing it is permissible (it plainly is) but whether the doctrine will be disowned, defended, or quietly carried forward by whoever wins. The doctrine was born from 2006 frustration — Israel couldn't stop Hezbollah firing from among civilians, so it flattened the Dahiya; strategists drew the lesson that vast destruction might deter the population from hosting fighters. The laws of war were written precisely to forbid that bargain (distinction, proportionality, no collective punishment), and the doctrine doesn't quietly violate them — it inverts them, by redefining the protected thing (the village, the power plant, the apartment block) as the target and naming deterrent civilian suffering as the goal. But the honest reading resists the easy line: Eisenkot's own trajectory cuts against it — the general who theorized disproportion is the politician who left the government over how this war was waged, after burying his son. Both are true. Holding them together is the point of grading rather than sloganeering: name the documented thing, state the law, carry the other side, let the reader weigh a record.
Help us fill these lines.
- OpenEisenkot's own current position on the doctrine — whether, as a candidate, he renounces, refines, or still defends the Dahiya approach, which no interview has pinned down cleanly.
- OpenA rigorous, sourced mapping of specific Gaza 2023- strikes onto the doctrine's stated logic vs ordinary targeting — the evidence the ICJ/ICC proceedings will turn on.
- OpenThe internal Israeli debate: which commanders and legal advisers endorsed or resisted the doctrine over the years, and how it sits alongside the separate 'Campaign Between Wars' concept.