THEBLACKBOOK AUDIT
Investigation · The CIA Crimes Hub

The Saudi officials linked to the 9/11 hijackers — and the evidence kept from investigators

The public was told it was a chance encounter, with no higher Saudi hand. The FBI’s own later finding — that the key figure was a Saudi spy — demolished that story, and it stayed classified for years.

A 2024 ProPublica investigation and the 9/11 families’ long-running lawsuit have surfaced videos, phone records, and documents — collected soon after the attacks but never shared with key investigators or the victims’ families. We grade the documented facts as fact, hold the “deliberately assisted” conclusion to the pending court case, and — rather than dismiss it — put the hardest question on the record: did the FBI and CIA merely mishandle this evidence, or deliberately bury it?

§1 · Summary Brief

What this page is about

From the beginning, one question hovered over the 9/11 investigation: was the Saudi government involved? The FBI, after the most extensive criminal probe in its history, concluded that the Saudi official who helped the first two hijackers in Southern California — Omar al-Bayoumi — had met them by chance and aided them unwittingly. The CIA saw no higher-level Saudi role. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission adopted those findings. That was the official story for two decades.

It has since collapsed at its foundation. In 2017 the FBI concluded that Bayoumi was, in fact, a Saudi intelligence “cooptee” who reported to the kingdom’s former ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan — and kept that finding secret until 2022. A 2024 ProPublica investigation and the 9/11 families’ lawsuit against Saudi Arabia have surfaced a fuller party tape, a 1999 video of Bayoumi surveying the U.S. Capitol, and phone records showing dozens of calls among the Saudi officials — material collected soon after the attacks but never shared with key investigators or the families. This page grades the documented facts as fact, attributes the “deliberately assisted” conclusion to the pending lawsuit, and raises the cover-up question as one to demand answers to.

What we are NOT saying
We are not asserting, as a proven fact, that the Saudi government ordered the 9/11 attacks or that its officials knew the men were terrorists — ProPublica itself says that “remains unclear,” and the “deliberately assisted” claim is the plaintiffs’ unadjudicated case. We do not adopt the broader “inside job” conspiracy theories about 9/11; nothing here rests on them. And we do not declare that the FBI and CIA criminally covered this up — we establish that evidence was withheld (a documented fact) and raise the question of whether that was deliberate (an open one). Every fact graded below is drawn from ProPublica’s reporting and the federal court record.
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▶ Dossier

The same investigation, restaged one beat at a time. Step through it here, or present it fullscreen.

CIA Crimes

The 9/11 Saudi files.

Two Saudi officials, the first two hijackers, and 23 years of evidence that key investigators and the victims' families were never shown — until a lawsuit and a declassification order pried it loose.

1 / 11▶ Present fullscreen
§2 · The Record

The official story, the spy, the tapes, and the pending case

The official verdict was coincidence — and no higher Saudi hand.

FACT

After the most extensive criminal probe in FBI history, the bureau concluded that Omar al-Bayoumi — the Saudi official who helped the first two hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, settle in San Diego (renting an apartment, opening a bank account) — had met them by chance and helped them unwittingly. The CIA said it saw no evidence of a higher-level Saudi role, and the bipartisan 9/11 Commission adopted those findings. The lead FBI agent on the Bayoumi team told the Commission his connection to the hijackers was, 'by all indications,' the result of 'a random encounter'; the Commission called Bayoumi 'an unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists.' That framing — echoed in the one-page summary the Bush administration released in 2005 — was the official account for two decades.

In 2017 the FBI concluded Bayoumi was a Saudi spy — and kept it secret until 2022.

FACT

The chance-encounter story depended on Bayoumi being a harmless, bumbling accountant. But in 2017 the FBI concluded he was in fact a Saudi intelligence 'cooptee' — a part-time agent — who, its reports say, reported to Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the kingdom's powerful former ambassador to Washington. The bureau kept that conclusion classified until 2022, when President Biden ordered agencies to declassify more of the 9/11 files. Bayoumi, though nominally a graduate student, did almost no studying; he was paid surreptitiously by the Saudi government through an aviation-services company in Houston while he set up a Saudi-funded mosque and spread money around the community. By the FBI's own later judgment, the pillar of the official account was false.

We should have had all of this three or four weeks after 9/11.

The withheld evidence: a Capitol 'tour' video, a fuller party tape, and dozens of calls.

FACT

Much of the newly surfaced evidence was collected soon after the attacks but never shared with key investigators or the families — and only reached the plaintiffs when British authorities began handing over materials seized from Bayoumi in 2023. It includes the full VHS of a February 2000 party Bayoumi hosted (the FBI had shared only an excerpt), in which the hijackers are carefully introduced and guests later helped build their support network; and a 1999 video in which Bayoumi surveys the U.S. Capitol from multiple angles, noting entrances and guard movements and referring to a 'plan.' A former FBI expert says the footage bears the hallmarks of terror pre-operational surveillance; the Saudi government's lawyers call it an innocent tourist video. Phone records show roughly five dozen calls between Bayoumi and Fahad al-Thumairy, a Culver City imam and Saudi consulate official who denied even knowing Bayoumi; Thumairy's U.S. visa was revoked in 2003 over suspected terrorism ties. The existence of this evidence, and that it was withheld, is documented fact; the 'terror surveillance' reading is the plaintiffs' interpretation, which we attribute.

A Saudi prince's phone called the hijackers' house — a lead surfaced only in 2024.

FACT

Declassified FBI records reported by the Florida Bulldog in 2024 show a cell phone belonging to a Saudi prince, Nawaf bin Saud bin Mohammed bin Abdulaziz, exchanged multiple calls around June 2000 with the San Diego home shared by the first two hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. By the records, the prince's phone had never called the house before that stretch and never called it again after. Separately, FBI agents on Operation Encore — the bureau's long-running Saudi-complicity probe — sought from 2007 onward to question Saudi princes tied to the case and to a suppressed airport surveillance video of the hijackers, and were never granted approval. FACT that the calls sit in the declassified record and that the interviews were sought and denied; what the calls concerned, and who was on the prince's end, the record does not resolve.

'Deliberately assisted' is the plaintiffs' case — serious, sourced, and not yet decided.

SOME SMOKE

The claim that Bayoumi and Thumairy deliberately assisted the hijackers — rather than helping them by coincidence — is the contention of the 9/11 families' lawsuit against the Saudi government, now before a New York federal judge weighing a Saudi motion to dismiss. ProPublica frames the new evidence as what it 'suggests,' not as proof, and notes that whether the Saudis knew the men were terrorists 'remains unclear,' with significant gaps still in the story. We grade the underlying facts as FACT and this top-line conclusion as SOME SMOKE, attributed to the plaintiffs and the court record — a strong, serious case that a court has yet to rule on. It is exactly the kind of well-documented but unproven claim we neither adopt nor bury: we lay out the evidence and mark the line.

§3 · Why It Matters

The security state decided what the public would know about its worst day

The families of the 2,977 people killed on September 11 were given a clean account — a coincidence, no state hand — while the evidence that complicated it sat unshared for two decades, including the FBI’s own conclusion that the central figure in the hijackers’ support network was a foreign intelligence asset. That is the throughline of the CIA Crimes hub: not the myth, but the archive — documented instances of the security apparatus managing what citizens are allowed to learn. It rhymes with the suppression cases tracked in Dangerous Knowledge, where inconvenient information is classified, delayed, or lost until it can no longer change anything.

Questions we should be demanding answers to

The most important questions here can’t yet be graded fact or fiction — which is a reason to press them, not drop them. We pose these as open questions, not findings:

  • Did the FBI and CIA merely mishandle the Saudi-complicity evidence, or did they deliberately downplay and withhold it — and if the latter, to protect what, and whom?
  • Who specifically decided that the seized Bayoumi materials and the 2017 “Saudi spy” finding would be kept from the 9/11 investigators and the victims’ families, and on whose authority?
  • How high did the knowledge go — to Prince Bandar, to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, to senior U.S. officials weighing the value of the U.S.–Saudi relationship — and what remains classified that would answer it?

We don’t assert the answers. The documented record — a spy finding buried for five years, evidence withheld for two decades — makes the questions fair, and demanding answers is itself part of the accountability this project exists to press for.

§4 · FAQ

Questions worth taking seriously

Is this a 9/11 'inside job' conspiracy theory?

No, and we reject those theories. This page rests entirely on ProPublica’s reporting and the federal court record: the FBI’s own 2017 finding that Bayoumi was a Saudi spy (declassified 2022), his documented role helping the first two hijackers, the phone records, the withheld videos, and the pending families’ lawsuit. The question is about a foreign government’s possible role and the U.S. agencies’ handling of the evidence — not about the attacks being staged.

If a court hasn't ruled, why publish now?

Because the documented facts don’t depend on the verdict. The FBI’s spy finding, the surreptitious Saudi payments, the ~60 Bayoumi–Thumairy calls, Thumairy’s visa revocation, and the two-decade withholding of evidence are established regardless of how the lawsuit ends. We grade those as fact, mark the “deliberately assisted” conclusion as the plaintiffs’ unproven case, and raise the cover-up question openly. Waiting for a final ruling to even discuss withheld evidence is how accountability dies of old age.

§5 · Standing Invitation

If you are named on this page

If you are named on this page, or are a party materially affected by the claims made here, and you wish to respond, correct the record, or add context, use the Contact page. Responses are published verbatim alongside the original claim, with the sender identified and the date of receipt. The channel stays open for the life of the page.

This site aggregates and grades a record that other outlets and primary sources have already put on the record. Every FACT-graded claim above is sourced to court filings, government reports, sworn whistleblower disclosures, published investigative journalism, or named-source statements. The citations are the accountability mechanism; this section is how you get on the record too.

§6 · Sources

The record

▦ Ledger gaps

Help us fill these lines.

This entry is graded on what’s on the public record. These are the blanks we know about. If you can source one, you’re rebuilding the ledger with us.

  • OpenHow the SDNY judge rules on the Saudi motion to dismiss, and what further discovery forces out.Help fill this →
  • OpenWho inside the FBI/CIA decided to withhold the seized Bayoumi materials and the 2017 'Saudi spy' finding from investigators and the victims' families, and on whose authority.Help fill this →
  • OpenHow high the knowledge went — Prince Bandar, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, senior U.S. officials weighing the U.S.-Saudi relationship — and what remains classified that would answer it.Help fill this →

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